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48

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM: C/CI/NSA			EX-100	
DATE: 22 May 1957				
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Show a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. C/CI		24 May 1957	[]	
2. NS/CI	16 June 1957		[]	
3. NS/CI/NSA	16 June 1957		[]	
4. NS/CI/NSA			[]	
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15. RI/FI				

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 20 1 2008

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FORM 1 DEC 56 610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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EX-100

SUBJECT: Col. Otto H. H.

1. Examination of German documents captured during World War II has produced a series of documents dealing with subject, an Hungarian Colonel, who worked for the Abwehr and defected to the Soviets in November 1944. The documents were originally held in England by the Department of State and the British authorities and have since been interdicted and returned to the Bonn Government. They are currently held in Washington by the Department of State where they may be viewed by referring to Serial 96, Frames 104945 through 104951 and Serial 1763 Frames 105268 through 105279. Prints of these frames are attached.

2. Since the available documents range from December 1943 to November 1944 and since it appears that many documents were not kept in this particular file, a comprehensive chronological account of subject's activities cannot be supplied. However, based on the materials found in Serial 96 (a "table dispatch" from the German Embassy in Sofia dated 22 December 1944) it appears that subject was sent as a representative of the Hungarian Government, at that day to discuss with two Americans the possibility of Hungary's withdrawal from the Axis and its active participation in the fight against Germany. In addition to the Hungarians (and to the Americans), subject had informed the Germans of these discussions and reportedly requested that his actions on the German behalf not be disclosed to anyone, including Hungarian officials even if the Hungarians chose officially to advise the Germans of the approach by the Americans. Subject left Sofia for Istanbul on 16 December 1943 and returned on 22 December 1943. In the evening of that same day he left Sofia for Budapest, having apparently first advised the authors of the "table dispatch," Mr. H. H. H., of the results of his talk with the Americans. In Budapest he was to render his report to the Hungarian Chief of Staff, Mr. H. H. H.

3. The following is a summary of the information subject furnished to H. H. H. regarding his discussion with the Americans:

a. Subject met two Americans in Istanbul on 18 December 1943 and proceeded with them to a private residence, the location of which subject could not recall as they changed cars several times. The Americans were 15 to 20 years old and in subject's opinion, were "special representatives of the American

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In particular, of the American Intelligence Service. Subject further felt that they were specialists in European matters and that - according to their own statements - they were in charge of American groups or "Special Representatives in Stockholm, Bern, and Berlin".

3. The Americans felt that a rapid decision to leave the area was a requirement Hungary could not overlook if it desired to have even a moderate influence on post-war decisions concerning borders, etc. The Americans felt that the time for the decision was most opportune, 1-6,; more opportune than during their previous discussion with subject in Istanbul. (This fact-escape that subject had had at least one previous meeting with them, although documents concerning the meeting have not been located). Subject replied that he had advised his superior, [redacted], of the decision expressed by the Americans previously, and that he (subject) had been instructed to inform the Americans that Hungary would always support Germany in the fight against communism, or Hungary recognizes that communism is an acute danger for Europe. The Americans were visibly disappointed and felt that there was no need for further discussion. However, subject gave them the opportunity to try and use additional arguments which resulted in stirring the questions of OTTO and his negotiation by the Americans as well as the American position concerning Austria. At the conclusion of the talk subject indicated that he might be swayed and asked the Americans what they could offer Hungary in return for its defection. Would the Americans be prepared to guarantee Hungary's 1,000 year old borders, even against the communists? The Americans replied that no action should be taken until all questions and that at the end of the war every nation would be able to demand as much as it had earned. At this point subject seemed the "Jim which had been given to him in Budapest" and reiterated Hungary's original position that it "will be impossible for Hungary ever to bear arms against Germany". The Americans broke up the conference by stating that "In such case American borders would come over Hungary. Subject left the door open for further negotiations by stating that he would transmit the American viewpoint to his superiors in Budapest.

4. In the conclusion of his report, [redacted] stated that the Hungarian agent (Jim) OTTO had arranged for the negotiations with the Americans, had advised subject that the British were unusually excited about the fact that he (it is not clear whether OTTO or subject was meant here) had negotiated with the Americans. According to the report "jealousy between the British and the Americans (in every language". The report also stated that the Hungarian Consul General in Istanbul, [redacted] protested strongly to subject that the Hungarian agent OTTO had been sending telegram to subject

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from Istanbul and that (as a result) GROMY was considered by him (UJVARY) and by the British as being a German agent. Subject, who, the report says managed to allay UJVARY's fears, felt that UJVARY was connected with the British.

5. Following subject's negotiations with the Americans in December 1943, there seems to be a gap in the materials as the next document (Serial 1763) was dated 22 March 1944 and very generally recounted subject's negotiations with the Americans. According to the document which was a cable sent from Sofia by BREKHELE, subject had related that the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff discussed the negotiations with Admiral GAMBES and had decided that the Germans did not wish them to be continued. The cable also contained the following additional information concerning subject:

a. About the time of the cable, subject had given up his residence in Sofia.

b. He continually complained about his intelligence activity in Turkey, because he was entirely dependent upon himself there; he could get no support in Turkey from the Abwehr which had been rendered ineffective by VERHEIMEN's defection; and he had no interest in turning to Hungarian Jews in Turkey who were active in intelligence.

c. Subject felt that the only remaining possibility was to maintain contact with the Naval Attache Admiral HAMMERS,

The final sentence in BREKHELE's cable indicated that he had been requested to conduct an investigation of subject. This conclusion is drawn from the statement that the above was all the information he could gather at the time and that he would transmit additional information as soon as possible.

6. On 19 April 1944 BREKHELE sent another cable from Sofia to Berlin in which he stated the following:

"He (subject) visited the embassy in order to request a transit visa for Vienna. He (subject) advised that one of his collaborators was approached by the Americans with the request to carry a w/t set to a particular person in Vienna. The collaborator agreed to this, on his (subject's) orders. He (subject) now desires to discuss this matter with the Abwehr office in Vienna and plans to fly to Vienna for that purpose. He expects much from this operation, because, if ably handled, American connections with Austrian resistance circles could be uncovered. He would like to request that his collaborator be issued a w/t set in Vienna, that the code be copied, and that the traffic be monitored so that all involved parties could be apprehended

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after everyone concerned had been already identified. He desires to contact the chief of the Abwehr in Berlin in order that his arrival in Vienna may be appropriately announced."

The second paragraph of the cable dealt with subjective impressions concerning Turkey which he felt would remain neutral, at least during that period of the war, as the hangings and the resulting destruction of Balkan cities had caused an effect upon the Turks. The final paragraph of the cable stated the following:

"As far as he (subject) is concerned, he had completely refrained from active participation in intelligence because as is known, he had been so interviewed by his government, and because during his discussion with Admiral GUMPERT he had gained the impression that GUMPERT was opposed to the furtherment of recent developments had caused the German Intelligence Service to broaden completely, which is especially regrettable in view of the intervening distances in Turkey. The British and Americans were most especially not along completely parallel directions at times they went even against each other. Only when speaking the language, who, fundamentally considered themselves very able when so interviewed, they (the Americans and the British) follow an identical, almost subversive, line of serious action."

REINHOLD concluded his cable by saying that subject would depart for Vienna on the following day by regularly scheduled aircraft.

7. On 25 April 1944, the E-commands of the office of the German Foreign Minister sent an internal note to the Witten, a high official of the Foreign Ministry in which it was stated that REINHOLD's cable (see paragraph 6 above) had aroused deep interest in the German Foreign Minister who felt that the matter related in the cable gives the impression of something being rotting. In view of this the Foreign Minister requested that the SD be contacted so that it may be determined by intensive surveillance whether (subject) might not be utilized in some way. The Foreign Minister also requested that he be informed by the SD regarding the conduct of the case.

8. In response to this request by the German Foreign Minister an appropriate communication was sent to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, SA-Chiefbauer, and Torglermann on 27 April 1944. The note stated that copies of REINHOLD's cables dated 22 March and 29 April 1944 were attached. In reply from the SD had been received by 2 June 1944 and hence a Witten note was sent to the SD on that date. On 8 or 9 June (the date is obscure) 1944 a reply was received from the SD and was shown to the Foreign Minister. The following is a translation of the reply:

Subject: Odoardo M. B., formerly in Berlin and Ankara, now in Budapest

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When Colonel HIRT was the Hungarian Military Attache in Berlin, he assumed contact with Anglo-American elements for intelligence purposes. This was mentioned by the Chief of the Abwehr Office in Berlin, Col. Dr. Carl HEINRICH. Is (HIRT) was prepared to place his contacts at the disposal of German officers. With the result of Lt. Col. HIRT, Col. HIRT also conducted the business of the Military Attache in London. With this assignment his contacts (with Anglo-American elements) were intensified. The results of his contacts were always reported to the Chief of the Abwehr Office in Berlin.

The telegram transmitted by the German Army in Berlin to the Foreign Ministry, represents proper coverage of detailed reports submitted by HIRT to the Abwehr Office in Berlin.

HIRT is judged by this office to be politically reliable. He especially excelled this (judgment) following the period 19 March 1944 when, contrary to numerous other members of Hungarian nobles in neutral countries, HIRT remained loyal to the government of Horthy.

Approval for the request of the Foreign Ministry, to use HIRT for German purposes had consequently already been prepared by this office. No utilization in this respect would appear to be now pending.

In the beginning of May, however, HIRT was recruited by the Commander of the Security Police in Hungary, because (the remainder of the sentence is illegible, but generally seemed to deal with a widespread plot against the Hungarian Government of that day). The investigation, however, completely concerned HIRT and his relatives followed. As a result of the arrest the view existed in the Hungarian Armed Ministry that HIRT had been conspired in and could not assume the post of Military Attache. In order to rehabilitate HIRT, not only internally, but to the outside world as well - and by this action a definite step against Germany can be detected - it has been planned to name HIRT Adjutant to the Armed Ministry, Col. Gen. (Gen.)-COLONEL or Adjutant to the Deputy Armed Minister Col. Gen. (Gen.)-GENERAL-ADJUTANT.

With the assignment of HIRT to a position which was due to the Secretary of Hungary, the opportunity to utilize him in an intelligence operation against the enemy forces is precluded from a practical point of view.

9. A succeeding document in the series is completely illegible. However, on 29 June 1944, Gen. WERNER is official of the German Foreign Ministry replied to the above findings of the AD in a comparatively informal note which was addressed: "Dear General SCHUMACHER". The following is a translation of the reply:

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"In your communication dated 9 June 1944, you transmitted your position regarding the case of Col. HITS. Your position has been brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister.

"In accordance with my instructions I am advising you that your favorable decision concerning Col. HITS is in no way shared by the Foreign Minister, particularly since it was HITS who, on orders of BULAT and GOLITSKY negotiated with the enemy in Athens, and then tried to clear himself by sending about 150,000 dollars which he made to the Greek chief in Sofia as well as to us. The Foreign Minister is consequently of the opinion that the greatest detriment and the greatest evil (than dealing with HITS is unwarranted, and that under no condition is he to receive support from us. The Foreign Minister considers it especially undesirable that HITS now be given the position of Adjutant to the General Minister. That HITS received 100,000 Lira to HITS, was obviously done for the purpose of having an ally when the most serious crisis might arise by saying that HITS (from HITS) was in this case was also collected. It does not mean HITS in any manner despite his (HITS's) release from confinement, particularly since, after his release, HITS attempted to secure exit to Athens by fraudulent means. All in all, HITS is obviously a crafty individual against whom all action is called for."

10. In a cable from Budapest dated 17 November 1944, the Foreign Minister reported that subject had deserted to the Soviets. According to the cable, subject's last position was "Chief of Staff of the 6th Hungarian (Army) Corps," (a subsequent document stated that he held that same position with the 7th Hungarian (Army) Corps). HITS further stated that he had sent repeated warnings concerning subject and that he had refused to receive him during the past months despite repeated requests from his for an appointment. HITS could, however, not help it that subject "received support here and there, and that a different type of exclamation concerning his actions in (the files of) the Ministry and the Office of the Chief of the Staff. The cable also stated that during 15 and 16 October 1944, the day of the political change when subject was Adjutant to the General Minister of War, HITS, his behavior was unusually correct. According to HITS, HITS, HITS (not further identified) believed that subject's desertion was due to the basic conviction and because he had lost all belief in a final German victory. The desertion was said to have had a very "uncomfortable" reaction among troops at the front.

11. According to a memorandum to the Foreign Minister of the Office of the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs dated 15 November 1944, prepared by the Office of the Foreign Minister, signed by the Foreign Minister, HITS himself was said to have reported that subject had fled to the Soviets by aircraft and it had made public an appeal (by subject) to fight Germany. In the memorandum HITS advised that the Foreign

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12. All persons named in the attachment have been recorded above. No Agency training of persons in the attachment has been conducted. However, SA/TJG has advised that subject is of interest to that branch as he is involved in the CROW case. It is requested that coordination be effected with this Staff if this information is to be transmitted to the field or passed to another intelligence service.

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